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Workers' Compensation
By NORMAN E. HARNED* AND SCOTT A. BACHERT**
INTRODUCTION
Historically, the most troublesome aspects of the Kentucky
Workers' Compensation Act' (Act) have been the questions of
disability and apportionment of liability. This Survey2 examines
recent court decisions that deal with these concepts, as well as
decisions clarifying or confusing the Act's substantive and pro-
cedural aspects.3
I. DISABILITY
After the Act was amended in 1980, many practitioners
throughout Kentucky understood 4 Kentucky Revised Statutes
* Partner in the firm of Cole, Harned & Broderick, Bowling Green, Kentucky.
L.L.B., 1965, University of Kentucky.
** Associate in the firm of Cole, Harned & Broderick, Bowling Green, Kentucky.
J.D., 1982, University of Kentucky.
I KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 342.012-.990 (Bobbs-Merrill 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 The survey period runs from July 1, 1983 to July 1, 1985. For a discussion of
court decisions rendered during the preceding survey period, see Harned, Kentucky Law
Survey-Workers' Compensation, 72 Ky. L.J. 479 (1983-84).
A number of court decisions, published and unpublished, have been omitted
from discussion in the text of this Survey. Many of these cases reiterate established
principles; others are of lesser importance and had to be excluded. For example, Stovall
v. Williams, 675 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984), which held that an award of total and
permanent disability for so long as claimant shall live will continue for the employee's
physical life and not occupational life as actuarially calculated; Armco, Inc. v. Felty,
683 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985), which held that the notice requirement of KRS §
342.186, now repealed, did not apply to occupational disease cases under KRS § 342.316;
and Boothe v. Special Fund, 668 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984), wherein the court of
appeals held that the repeal of KRS § 342.180 took effect immediately so that any
existing and unfiled claims were barred thirty days after the date of the statute's repeal.
" See generally Harned, supra note 2.
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(KRS) section 342.730(1)(b), as amended,' to provide a claimant
who had sustained a work-related injury the greater of his oc-
cupational disability or medical functional impairment as meas-
ured by the American Medical Association (AMA) Guides to
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides).6 Practi-
tioners believed that the amendments allowed an employee to
recover income benefits for a work-related injury that left him
with a physical disability, even if the Board later determined
that he was not occupationally disabled.
Nevertheless, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in Cook v. Paducah
Recapping Service,7 interpreted KRS section 342.730 to impose a
finding of occupational disability as a threshold requirement for
recovery. The Court stated:
We construe K.R.S. 342.730(1)(b) to mean that when the claim-
ant has some degree of disability as defined under K.R.S.
342.620(11) [sic], viz., decrease of wage earning capacity or
loss of ability to compete due to his injury, then and only then
is he entitled to the greater of his bodily function impairment
under the guidelines or his percentage of disability under K.R.S.
342.620(11) [sic].'
The Court emphasized the use of the word "disability" in
the introductory phrases of KRS section 342.730(1)(b) and gave
it meaning as it is defined in KRS section 342.620(2). 9 This is,
5 KRS § 342.730(1)(b) (Bobbs-Merrill 1983) provides in part:
For permanent, partial disability, sixty-six and two-thirds [percent] (66 2/
3W) of the employee's average weekly wage but not more than seventy-
five percent (75%) of the state average weekly wage as determined by KRS
342.740, multiplied by his percentage of disability caused by the injury or
occupational disease as determined by "guides to the evaluation of per-
manent impairment," American medical association, 1977 edition, or by
his percentage of disability as determined under KRS 342.620(11), which-
ever is greater, for a maximum period, from the date the disability arises,
of four hundred twenty-five (425) weeks.
6 THE AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N COMMITTEE ON RATING OF MENTAL AND PHYSICAL
IMPAIRMENT, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIPMENT (2d ed. 1977).
No. 84-SC-1031-TRG (Ky. May 23), reh'g denied, (Ky. Sept. 5, 1985).
Id., slip op. at 7. Except for the quotation above, the Court otherwise correctly
cited KRS § 342.620(12) (Cum. Supp. 1984) as the section defining "disability." KRS §
342.620(11) was the applicable provision prior to a 1984 amendment.
9 KRS § 342.620(2): "Disability" means a decrease of wage earning capacity due
to injury or loss of ability to compete to obtain the kind of work the employee is
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of course, a strict interpretation of the statute, but not one
without precedent. For instance, in Couliette v. International
Harvester Co.,1O the applicable statutory language entitled a
claimant to benefits for "lost wages due to his injury, or bodily
functions disability benefits, whichever is greater."" The claim-
ant argued that "disability," as used in the statute, includes
functional as well as occupational disability.' 2 The Court disa-
greed, stating: "The answer, we think, lies in the word 'benefits.'
Bodily functional disability is not one and the same as bodily
functional disability benefits. The latter term, used in the statute,
can mean nothing other than 'benefits allowable by reason of
bodily functional disability' vis-a-vis lost wages.' ' 3 The Court
concluded that there was nothing in the statute to modify its
holding in Osborne v. Johnson, 4 "that 'disability' means oc-
cupational as distinguished from purely functional impair-
ment."' 5
The effect of Cook may well be to deny compensation ben-
efits to a number of injured workers. It is not unusual for a
worker who has suffered physical impairment measurable under
the AMA Guides to return to his normal employment without
occupational restrictions. These workers will be denied an award
absent a showing of occupational disability.' 6 Consequently, if
legislative intent is to award a claimant income benefits based
upon the percentage of bodily impairment as measured under
the AMA Guides, then the legislature should amend KRS section
342.730(1)(b), substituting the term "impairment" for the word
"disability."
customarily able to do, in the area where he lives, taking into consideration his age,
occupation, education, effect upon employee's general health of continuing in the kind
of work he is customarily able to do, and impairment or disfigurement.
545 S.W.2d 936 (Ky. 1976).
KRS § 342.620(9) as enacted in 1972. Similar language was also included in KRS
§ 342.730, prior to its amendment.
See 545 S.W.2d at 938.
" Id.
432 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1968).
" 545 S.W.2d at 937.
6 An interpretation of the statute that would deny the claimant at least a functional
impairment will discourage many attorneys from accepting cases that involve otherwise
minor injuries. Without some guarantee of a recovery, not only of income benefits, but
also of attorney's fees, there may be many cases that will go unfiled.
1985-86]
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In Stovall v. Stumbo,17 a case of first impression, the court
of appeals ruled that an employee cannot be found to have
suffered total and permanent injury resulting from the same
cause on two separate occasions. In Stovall, an employee was
found to have been totally disabled as a result of pneumoconiosis
in 1973. Four years later, the worker returned to work with a
different employer, subsequently filed another case, and was
again found to be totally disabled by reason of pneumoco-
niosis. I I
The court of appeals reversed the findings of the Worker's
Compensation Board (Board) because the Board failed to take
into consideration KRS section 342.730(3), 19 which requires re-
duction of an award "on account of a prior injury if income
benefits in both cases are for disability of the same member or
function.... -12o There was no evidence that the employee had
recovered from the prior disability. 2'
An employee is possibly subject to a second reduction under
KRS section 342.120(5), which may permit reduction of an award
to the extent of the employee's prior active disability. 2 Conse-
quently, if the employee in Stovall had not recovered from the
disability that resulted from prior injury, the employee would
have had to overcome section 342.730 and section 342.120. There
has been no indication, however, as to how these statutes would
work together. 23
" 676 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
', Id. at 469.
KRS § 342.730(3), effective from January 1, 1973, through July 15, 1982,
provided:
The period of any income benefits payable under this section on account
of any injury shall be reduced by the period of income benefits paid or
payable under this Chapter on account of a prior injury if income benefits
in both cases are for disability of the same member or function or different
part of the same member of [sic] function, and the income benefits payable
on account of the subsequent disability in whole or in part would duplicate
the income benefits payable on account of the pre-existing disability.
See 676 S.W.2d at 469. Nearly identical language now appears in KRS § 342.730(2).
20 676 S.W.2d at 469.
21 Id. The court noted that the doctors' depositions indicated that the disease is
progressive and results from long-term exposure to coal dust. Further, the plaintiff
himself stated that he had suffered for six or seven years without any recovery.
See KRS § 342.120(5) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
23 There is some question whether KRS § 342.120 excludes prior active conditions
[Vol. 74
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In Eaton Axle Corp. v. Nally,24 the Kentucky Supreme Court
discussed the proof necessary to prove a "disability." In Eaton
Axle Corp. the Board found that the employee was one hundred
percent occupationally disabled,2 but the court of appeals re-
versed, finding that the evidence supported only a partial disa-
bility. The court based its decision on the employee's testimony
that he was a self-trained welder, and that he had available to
him this form of employment. The court apparently dismissed,
however, the medical evidence indicating that the employee could
not lift over twenty pounds, and the employee's own testimony
that welding requires the ability to lift. The Kentucky Supreme
Court, upon motion of both the claimant and the employer,
granted discretionary review. 26
The Kentucky Supreme Court, relying on Caudill v. Malo-
ney's Discount Store,27 reversed, ruling that the employee's tes-
timony did not compel a finding of partial disability.2 8 The Court
further stated that testimony by occupational experts that there
might be certain jobs available to the employee, even with his
restrictions, "is not such evidence as compels any specific find-
ings by the Workers' Compensation Board, which body is the
fact finder, with the right to 'believe part of the evidence and
disbelieve other parts of the evidence.' "29
from an employee's award. The answer will turn upon the interpretation of the language
"resulting condition" as found in KRS § 342.120(5). If this phrase refers only to
disability caused by the second injury, as opposed to the previous conditions as well,
then the Special Fund may not be liable to the employee for the prior active disability.
The Board and courts, however, have continued to carve out an award of prior active
disability. The question of the meaning of this amendment apparently has not been
presented to the courts.
688 S.W.2d 334 (Ky. 1985).
, Id. at 336. The Board assessed 50% compensation against the employer and
50% against the Special Fund, as provided for in KRS § 342.120.
688 S.W.2d at 336.
560 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1977). The Court in Caudill stated:
We conclude that Caudill's own testimony, education, work experience and
physical condition, together with the medical evidence introduced by her,
established an evidentiary foundation sufficient to support, but not to
compel, a finding by the Board that she was incapable of performing any
kind of work of regular employment and, therefore, was totally disabled
under the Osborne v. Johnson formula.
Id. at 16.
23 See 688 S.W.2d at 337.
-1 Id. (quoting 560 S.W.2d at 16).
1985-86]
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As to the definition of disability, the Court stated that KRS
section 342.620(11) did not alter the concept of disability as set
forth in Osborne v. Johnson.30 Although the statutory definition
of disability, "work the employee is customarily able to do," 3'
is different from the language of Osborne, which speaks of "the
work the man is capable of performing, "32 the Court ruled that
these standards are essentially the same.3 3 The Court, in making
this determination, referred to Couliette v. International Har-
vester Co.,34 the same case that it relied upon in Cook v. Pa-
ducah Racapping Service."
II. APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
In the last survey of workers' compensation law, the author
noted that the court of appeals, in at least one opinion, 36 con-
tinued to confuse the concepts of apportionment and liability.3 7
The Supreme Court's decision in Stovall v. Dal-Camp, Inc.,3
however, should dispel this confusion and clarify that when
medical evidence establishes a "work-related exertion would have
produced no disability had it not been for an underlying non-
disabling condition, ' 39 the entire liability should be apportioned
to the Special Fund.
In Stovall, the medical evidence established that the
employees 4° would not have suffered heart attacks while per-
forming work-related activities had they not suffered from ar-
teriosclerotic heart disease.4' Although neither the arteriosclerotic
- 432 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1968). See 688 S.W.2d at 337 ("[T]he statute is a mere
codification of Osborne...
3- KRS § 342.620(12).
32 432 S.W.2d at 803.
688 S.W.2d at 337.
545 S.W.2d 936 (Ky. 1976).
1, No. 84-SC-1031-TRG (Ky. May 23), reh'g denied, (icy. Sept. 5, 1985).
16 Wells v. Collins, 30 Ky. L. Summ. 6, at 3 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as KLS].
1' See Harned, supra note 2, at 488.
3- 669 S.W.2d 531 (Ky. 1984).
' Id. at 536.
,o Stovall was a consolidated action involving three different cases in which the
claimants had suffered heart attacks as a result of work-related stress. See 669 S.W.2d
at 532.
c 669 S.W.2d at 534.
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heart disease nor the work-related stress alone would have re-
sulted in a work-related disability, the arteriosclerosis, being a
pre-existing nondisabling condition, was capable of being aroused
into disabling reality by work-related stress. "2 The Court stated:
In logic it would appear that liability for the resulting
disability should be apportioned in the ratio that the work-
connected exertion or stress and the underlying disease each
contributed to bring about the heart attack.
Apportionment, however, is not dictated by logic but by
statute, and the statute plainly directs that "the employer shall
be liable only for the degree of disability which would have
resulted from the latter injury or occupational disease had
there been no pre-existing disability or dormant, but aroused
disease or condition.2 43
Stovall is not a reinterpretation of the apportionment statute,
rather it is a reaffirmation of existing case law.44 Prior court
decisions have recognized other situations in which liability for
disability benefits should be apportioned entirely to the Special
Fund.45 Therefore, the impact of Stovall should not be limited
merely to heart attack cases, but applied to all cases in which
the medical evidence establishes that had it not been for the pre-
existing but dormant disease or condition, the employee would
have suffered no permanency as a result of the work-related
incident.46
Even though liability for all income benefits may be appor-
tioned to the Special Fund, the employer is still responsible for
medical and hospital expenses. 47 In Claude N. Fannin Wholesale
,2 Id. at 525.
Id. at 535 (quoting KRS § 342.120(4) (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1984)).
See, e.g., Land v. Starks, 628 S.W.2d 346, 346 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (fact that
none of claimant's occupational disability was attributable to his work-related injury
alone, and thus employer was not liable, does not preclude imposition of liability for
compensation on the Special Fund); Land v. Burden, 626 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1981) (shift of liability to Special Fund does not render an otherwise compensable
injury noncompensable).
" See, e.g., Young v. Fulkerson, 463 S.W.2d 118, 119 (Ky. 1971) (Special Fund
is liable for portion of worker's disability remaining after deducting portion attributable
solely to subsequent injury, which employer must pay.).
- For example, back injuries.




Co. v. Thacker,48 the court of appeals noted that KRS section
342.120 addresses only income benefits.49 The Thacker court
further stated that KRS section 342.020, which provides that
"the employer shall pay for the cure and relief from the effects
of an injury or occupational disease such medical, surgical, and
hospital treatment ... as may reasonably be required," 5" clearly
places the burden of these expenses upon the employer regardless
of the employer's liability for the income benefits.5 1
In separate cases, the Supreme Court and the court of ap-
peals examined situations in which the pre-existing dormant con-
dition in question was itself work-related. In 1976, the Supreme
Court, in Haycraft v. Corhart Refractories Co. 52 apportioned
liability to the employer for the disability portion that arose out
of a gradual type of injury occurring over a number of years.
The Special Fund had to contribute for the portion existing
regardless of employment.5 3 Haycraft, the employee, suffered
from a chronic back problem, which medical evidence estab-
lished was a direct result of fifteen years employment with the
same employer.5 4 The Court found that the nature of the em-
ployment caused the degenerative disc disease to manifest itself
into an active disability sooner than it would have had the work
been of a less physical nature." Consequently, the Court found
that the pre-existing condition itself was a work-related injury
as defined by the workers' compensation statutes.5 6
4- 661 S.W.2d 477 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
I' d. at 479.
KRS § 342.020(l) (1983) provides in full:
In addition to all other compensation provided in this chapter, the employer
shall pay for the cure and relief from the effects of an injury or occupa-
tional disease such medical, surgical and hospital treatment, including
nursing, medical and surgical supplies and appliances, as may reasonably
be required at the time of the injury and thereafter during disability, or as
may be required for the cure and treatment of an occupational disease.
The employee may select a physician to treat his injury, and the hospital
in which he shall be treated.
" See 661 S.W.2d at 479-80.
52 544 S.W.2d 222 (Ky. 1976).
3 Id. at 225.
54 Id. at 225-27.




In Southern Kentucky Concrete Contractors, Inc. v. Camp-
bell,17 the employee's disability was not the result of a single
incident, but the result of twenty-four years of heavy labor.58
The employee in Southern, unlike the life-long employee of
Corhart Refractories Company in Haycraft, had worked for
several employers over the years, but had been employed by
Southern for only one and one-half years when he became disabled.
In Haycraft, liability was apportioned to the employer "based
upon the percentage of disability attributable to the work."5 9
The Southern court found "that the 'work' referred to in Hay-
craft is the 'work' that occurred while the claimant was in the
employ of that company." 6 Consequently, the Southern court
found: "[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, Southern shall be
liable for that percentage of Campbell's disability which is equal
to the percentage of Campbell's worklife spent with Southern.
The remainder of his disability is the responsibility of the Special
Fund."
61
In O.K. Precision Tool & Die Co. v. Wells,62 the Supreme
Court affirmed Southern and distinguished Haycraft. The em-
ployee in O.K., like the employee in Southern, suffered from a
gradual injury resulting from fifteen years of assembly line work,
but had been employed by O.K. for only two and one-half
months when she became disabled.63
The Court noted that "[t]he reason for apportionment in
Haycraft was because the condition involved degenerative disc
changes unrelated to employment as well as gradual type injury
related to the work, whereas here we have a work related con-
dition pre-existing present employment." 64 Continuing, however,
the Court stated:
KRS 342.120 does not restrict pre-existing conditions to degen-
erative changes unrelated to employment. The language of the
662 S.W.2d 221 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
I ld. at 222.
. Id.
60 Id.
" Id. at 222-23.
678 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1984).




statute creating the Special Fund is broad enough to cover a
pre-existing condition mechanically induced by the nature of
past employment, such as the present case, as well as degen-
erative changes unrelated to employment.6 1
The Court said "[ilt would be arbitrary and unreasonable to
interpret Haycraft to mandate that the last employer is 'at risk'
for the entire condition if induced by work performed over many
years with multiple employers." 66 Furthermore, "it would con-
flict with a reasonable interpretation of the language in KRS
342.120' '67 as well as defeat "the legislative purpose for estab-
lishing the Special Fund. ' 68 The Court concluded that Southern
was consistent with present law and appropriate to a disposition
of this case.69
The fact that a work-related injury may lead to the discovery
of a pre-existing disease or condition may not support a finding
that such condition was aroused or brought into disabling reality
by reason of that work-related injury. In Wells v. Davidson,70
an employee's lower back pain during the course of his employ-
ment led to the diagnosis of multiple myeloma, a type of can-
cer. 7' The court of appeals found that the exposure of cancer
was not an equivalent of aggravation or arousal under the lan-
guage of KRS section 342.120.72 Quoting from Professor Lar-
son's treatise on workers' compensation, the court noted:
Trauma as an inciting or aggravating mechanism does not have
a place in cancer development, and schooled pathologists do
not include injury as a mechanism by which cancer is initiated
or stimulated. It will be found, then, that denials of compen-
sation in this category are almost entirely the result of holdings
65 Id. at 399-400.
6 Id. at 400.
67 Id. The Court noted that the purpose of KRS § 342.120 "is to prevent the
employer from being held responsible for more of a compensation award than is
attributable to a disability incurred in the course of an employee's employment with
him." Id. (quoting Transport Motor Express, Inc. v. Finn, 574 S.W.2d 277 (Ky. 1978)).
678 S.W.2d at 400.
Id. at 401.
70 689 S.W.2d 610 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
"1 Id. at 611.
72 The court noted that the medical evidence showed that there was no causal
connection between the injury and the myeloma. Id. at 612.
[Vol. 74
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
that the evidence did not support a finding that the employ-
ment contributed to the final result.7
The court, however, did not foreclose the possibility that cancer
could be a pre-existing condition capable of being aroused into
disabling reality, but left the question to be answered by medical
evidence. 74
In an interesting case, the court of appeals reversed a Board
decision apportioning liability for an employee's depression to
the Special Fund. In Stovall v. Swanson,75 an employee suffered
a temporary back injury that triggered an episode of depres-
sion. 76 The Board found that the employee was totally occupa-
tionally disabled and apportioned liability to the Special Fund.
Psychiatrists testified that there were no pre-existing conditions
and, if it had not been for the back injury, that there would
have been no depression. 77
The psychiatrists apparently testified that the depression was
in part due to the stress of everyday life, rather than an identi-
fiable neurosis. The court held, "To attempt to label these
stresses of living as pre-existing conditions that would trigger
liability of the Special Fund is to stretch the meaning of the
statute far beyond what was contemplated by the Legislature." 78
A condition will be considered dormant and pre-existing for
purposes of KRS section 342.120 only if it is reasonably fore-
seeable that the condition will become disabling. 79 Consequently,
the court remanded the case for entry of an order apportioning
one hundred percent of the liability to the employer 0
For an award in an occupational disease case to be appor-
tioned between the employer and the Special Fund, there must
be affirmative evidence that the employee has been exposed to
the causing agent while working for another employer. In Stovall
11 Id. (quoting 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 12.24
(1985)).
74 See 689 S.W.2d at 612-13.
681 S.W.2d 438 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
76 Id. at 439.
, Id. at 440.
79 Id.
Id. (citing Yocom v. Jackson, 554 S.W.2d 891, 896 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977)).
681 S.W.2d at 440.
1985-86]
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v. Mullen,8 ' the Board apportioned an award seventy-five percent
to the Special Fund and twenty-five percent to the employer.8 2
The court of appeals reversed finding that there was no evidence
of exposure during prior employment.83 The initial burden of
proof is on the employer to establish exposure at more than one
place of employment. 4 Once that burden is met, the Special
Fund then must attempt to prove that the disability was caused
solely by the last exposure .8
In Sovereign Coal Corp. v. Adkins,86 the Board found that
an employee was fifty percent disabled as a result of a back
injury and fifty percent disabled as result of pneumoconiosis.87
One-half of the liability for the back injury and twenty-five
percent of the liability for the pneumoconiosis was apportioned
to the employer. The Board ordered that benefits be paid for so
long as the employee remained disabled. The employer appealed,
arguing that it should pay benefits for only 425 weeks, as if the
employee had sustained a permanent partial disability, and that
the Special Fund should pay all income benefits due thereafter.3
The court of appeals rejected the employer's argument, find-
ing that the two partial disabilities left the employee with a total
occupational disability, thus entitling the claimant to lifetime
benefits. Once this determination was made, the court then
wrestled with the question of liability between the employer and
the Special Fund. 9 The court, citing Transport Motor Express,
Inc. v. Finn90 for the proper method of computation, held:
"[T]he employer and the Special Fund [should] each be required
to pay a share of the whole award based upon the ratio that
their assigned percentages of disability bear to each other." 9'
The court noted that it "would have little difficulty resolving
-' 674 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
91 Id. at 527.
" Id. at 528.
See id.
" Id.




574 S.W.2d 277 (Ky. 1978).
9, 690 S.W.2d at 131.
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this question if it were governed by the present version of KRS
342.120[4].' ' 92 Unfortunately, the present version of KRS section
342.120(4) did not apply to this case since the action arose in
1981.91
III. INURmS ARISING OUT OF COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
During this survey period, both the Kentucky Supreme Court
and the court of appeals examined the issue of whether an injury
arose out of the course of employment. Kentucky may have
adopted the positional risk doctrine94 in Tommy Thompson Pro-
duce Co. v. Coulter.95 In this case, employees from both Thomp-
son Produce and Netter Produce were engaged in friendly
discussion when the owner of Netter Produce, Mr. Netter,
brought out a pistol and fired a shot into the air.96 Mr. Netter
then tossed the gun to the claimant, Coulter, an employee of
Thompson Produce, but when Coulter caught the gun, the gun
discharged and Netter was shot.97 Coulter, still carrying the gun,
stumbled into Thompson Produce. Within minutes, Netter's son
went into Thompson Produce, wrestled the gun away from
Coulter, and shot and killed Coulter. The employer, Thompson
Produce, argued that Coulter's death was not work-related be-
cause the positional risk theory did not apply to this case. The
court of appeals disagreed. 98
Id. KRS § 342.120(4) states that the employer is liable to pay "a percentage of
the full income benefits awarded ... equal to the percentage of disability which would
have resulted from the latter injury or occupational disease ..... Id.
See 690 S.W.2d at 131.
'' See notes 99-112 infra and accompanying text. Larson defines the "positional
risk" doctrine as:
An injury arises out of the employment if it would not have occured but
for the fact that the conditions and obligations of the employment placed
claimant in the position where he was injured.... This theory supports
compensation, for example, in cases of stray bullets, roving lunatics, and
other situations in which the only connection of the employment with the
injury is that its obligations placed the employee in the particular place at
the particular time when he was injured by some neutral force....
1 A. LARSON, supra note 73, at § 6.50.
678 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).





The court of appeals relied upon Corken v. Corken Steel
Products, Inc.," a case in which an employee was shot by a
stranger without any reason or provocation.'00 In Corken, the
Court held: "Corken's employment was the reason for his pres-
ence at what turned out to be a place of danger, and except for
his presence there he would not have been killed. Hence it is
our opinion that his death arose out of the employment."''0
While the court of appeals in neither case specifically adopted
the concept of positional risk, it is apparent that the court
applied the doctrine.'02
Coulter, however, does not present a factual situation to
which the positional risk doctrine can be properly applied. The
doctrine applies to those situations in which the employment
requires the employee to be in the place of danger. 03 "When
the animosity of dispute that culminates in an assault is imported
into the employment from claimant's domestic or private life,
and is not exacerbated by the employment, the assault does not
arise out of the employment under any test."0 4Since in Coulter
there was apparently no evidence that employment placed the
employee and his assailant in the same location or caused any
additional friction between them, the court should have treated
it as a noncompensable injury.
In Rabbitt Hash Iron Works, Inc. v. Strubel,05 the court of
appeals refused to find that an injury was work-related where
an employee was injured on the employer's premises, but while
he was off the employee's payroll and working for his own
benefit.106 The employee in Rabbitt had no set work schedule
and no minimum hours. Instead, "he was paid only for that
time during which he was actually working for the iron works
and . . . received no compensation for the time which he spent
- 385 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1965).
Io Id. at 949.
1' Id. at 950.
102 "The Court of Appeals ... held that husband's death was work-related under
the 'positional risk' theory and, thus, compensable .... " 678 S.W.2d at 794.
10 See A. LARSON, supra note 73, at § 10.12.
104 Id. at § 11.21.
101 689 S.W.2d 606 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).




on the employer's premises waiting for work to be assigned."' 0 7
He was permitted, however, while awaiting his next assignment,
to use the company's equipment for his personal use. It was
during such a time that the employee was injured. 0 8
The court of appeals refused to find that this injury was
work-related under the four-part test set forth in W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Payne.'°9 According to Payne, an injury is work-related
if:
(1) IT]he injury occurred during working hours, (2) the injury
occurred on the employer's premises, (3) the injury occurred
during a period in which there was a lull in the work to be
performed for the employer, and (4) the employer had ac-
quiesced in the employee's use of his tools during such pe-
riods." 0
Although Larson's treatise on workers' compensation law,
the source of this four-prong test, states that an injury is work-
related only if it occurs during working hours,' the Kentucky
courts appear to require that the employee be on the payroll at
the time of the injury. The Rabbitt court seemed to clarify this
fact when it stated: "Unlike the situation in W.R. Grace & Co.,
... where the claimant was injured during his normal, set work
hours but during a lull period for which he was being paid,
Strubel [(the employee in Rabbitt)] was off duty, off the payroll,
and working solely for his own benefit.""12 This may not, how-
ever, be a sound basis for determining whether an injury is
work-related, especially in those cases in which an employee,
although not on the payroll, is required to be on the employer's
premises and available for work at all times.
IV. ExcLusIvE REMEDY PROVISION
In one of the most important cases decided during this survey
period, the Kentucky Supreme Court again confronted the ex-
' Id.
501 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. 1973). See 689 S.W.2d at 607-08.
110 689 S.W.2d at 607-08 (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Payne, 501 S.W.2d 252).
The four-prong test was adopted by the Payne Court from Larson's treatise. See 1A A.
LmAusoN, supra note 73, at § 27.31(b).
M IA A. LARsON, supra note 73, at § 27.31(b).
MI 689 S.W.2d at 608.
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clusive remedy provisions of KRS section 342.690." 3 In Burrell
v. Electric Plant Board of Franklin,"4 an employee was injured
on his employer's premises when he came into contact with a
high voltage electric line." 5 The employee brought an action in
circuit court alleging negligence by the Electric Plant Board." 6
Subsequently, the Plant Board, alleging employer negligence and
seeking contribution and indemnity, filed pleadings against the
employer." 7 The circuit court dismissed the claims against the
employer since the employer had already paid all compensation
benefits due the employee." 8 The court of appeals affirmed the
circuit court decision as to contribution, but reversed on the
issue of indemnity." ' 9 The case was presented to the Kentucky
Supreme Court on appeal. 20
The Supreme Court, writing through Justice Liebson, held
that an action for indemnity and contribution could be main-
tained by a third party against the employer, but that an award
of contribution could not exceed the employer's liability for
workers' compensation benefits.' 2 ' The Court found that Ken-
' KRS § 342.690(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1983) provides, in part:
(1) If an employer secures payment of compensation as required by this
chapter, the liability of such employer under this chapter shall be exclusive
and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his
legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin,
and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at
law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death .... The liability
of an employer to another person who may be liable for or who has paid
damages on account of injury or death of an employee of such employer
arising out of and in the course of employment and caused by a breach of
any duty or obligation owed by such employer to such other shall be
limited to the amount of compensation and other benefits for which such
employer is liable under this chapter on account of such injury or death,
unless such other and the employer by written contract have agreed to
share liability in a different manner.
Id.
.4 676 S.W.2d 231 (Ky. 1984).
"I Id. at 232.
116 Id.
"I Id. at 232-33.
See id. (action against employer barred under KRS § 342.690(1)).
"9 676 S.W.2d at 233.
Id. at 232-33.
M Id. at 233.
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tucky's unusual contribution statute'22 did not require joint lia-
bility but only joint causation, and concluded that such an
interpretation would not conflict with the language of KRS
section 342.690.123 The Supreme Court did not rule on the issue
of indemnity limits, as that issue was not presented on appeal. 124
In ruling that a third party has a right to maintain an
indemnity action, the Supreme Court, as well as the court of
appeals, relied on Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Jackson County
Rural Electric Cooperative Corp. 25 and Louisville Gas & Electric
Co. v. Koenig'26 for the proposition that indemnity is a constitu-
tionally protected right. 27
The Court rejected the employer's argument in Burrell that
Kentucky Utilities and Louisville Gas had been "implicitly over-
rule[d]" by Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Government Employees
Insurance28 In Fireman's Fund, former Chief Justice Palmore
held that indemnity was not a jural right within the field of no-
fault insurance, since the rights under the no-fault act and the
Workers' Compensation Act did not exist at the time the present
Kentucky Constitution was adopted.' 29 The Burrell Court, how-
ever, found that the Fireman's Fund decision actually dealt with
the right of subrogation and not indemnity. 30 If Chief Justice
Palmore's rationale does not apply within the context of work-
ers' compensation, and indemnity is, in fact, a jural right, then
it logically follows that not only is the legislature precluded from
barring an indemnity action, but it is also precluded from lim-
iting the right of indemnity to workers' compensation benefits
payable under the Act.
Burrell leaves open many questions that must be decided in
future decisions, especially cases involving the recently adopted
'- KRS § 412.030 (1983), which provides: "Contribution among wrongdoers may
be enforced where the wrong is a mere act of negligence and involves no moral
turpitude." Id.
See 676 S.W.2d at 234-35.
'a Id. at 237.
' 438 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1968).
438 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 1968).
1 676 S.W.2d at 235.
'-1 Id. at 235-36. See Fireman's Fund Ins. v. Government Employees Ins., 635
S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1982).
Q' See 635 S.W.2d at 477.
110 676 S.W.2d at 236.
1985-86]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
doctrine of comparative negligence' and cases in which an
employer seeks to assert its subrogation rights. 3 2 Specifically,
for instance, if a jury apportions liability for an employee's
injuries thirty percent to the employee, twenty percent to the
employer and fifty percent to the third-party defendant, may
the employer seek reimbursement under its subrogation claim
for eighty percent of the benefits paid or for only fifty percent?
Will the third-party defendant's right of contribution continue
to be a fifty percent liability, regardless of the percentage of
negligence, or will contribution begin to reflect the actual per-
centage of negligence assessed by the jury? Since the Court's
final word on Burrell was not issued until after the Court had
adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence, 3 3 the Court
should have examined, and answered, some of these questions.
In Allied Machinery, Inc. v. Wilson, 134 the court of appeals
applied the exclusive remedy provision 3 5 to prevent a "loaned
servant" from recovering common law damages. The claimant
was employed by Dingo Coal Mining Company "as a 'greaser'
for its heavy equipment."' 36 At the time of his injury, however,
he was assisting a field mechanic of Allied Machinery in repair-
ing a Dingo truck that had broken down. The claimant had
assisted the Allied mechanic for three days when the claimant
was injured during the course of those repairs. The evidence
established that the claimant was working at the mechanic's
direction. 37 The claimant won a jury verdict against Allied Ma-
chinery and the mechanic in circuit court, but the court of
appeals reversed.' 38
"I See Hilen v. Hayes, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
132 See KRS § 342.700 (1983), which expressly gives the employer the right of
subrogation.
"I The original decision in Burrell was issued on February 16, 1984, but was
modified on a denial of rehearing on October 4, 1984, after the decision in Hilen.
.34 673 S.W.2d 728 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
,31 See KRS § 342.700. The exclusive remedy provision "permits an injured em-
ployee to proceed both against the employer for compensation and by civil action against
the . . . 'statutory' employer but limits recovery to one entity." 673 S.W.2d at 729. See
notes 142-43 infra and accompanying text.
,36 73 S.W.2d at 729.
,31 See id. at 730.
"I Id. at 729-30.
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The court of appeals found, based on the evidence presented,
that the employee was a "loaned servant" of Allied Machinery
and that his recovery was limited to compensation benefits. 39
In Kentucky, whether an individual is a "loaned servant" is
determined by a three-part test.'14 An individual is a "loaned
servant" if:
(a) IThe employee has made a contract of hire expressed or
implied with the special employer, (b) the work being done is
essentially that of the special employer, [and] (c) the special
employer has the right to control the details of the work.' 4'
KRS section 342.700 provides that when an employee is injured
through the actions of some third person "the injured employee
may either claim compensation or proceed at law by civil action
against such other person to recover damages.. ,,"42 But, if it
is determined that the employee is a "loaned servant" of the
special employer, then that special employer is not considered
to be "some other person" as envisioned by the statute and is
entitled to the protection of the exclusive remedy provision.' 43
In M.J. Daly Co. v. Varney, 44 however, the Kentucky Su-
preme Court found that an employee working for another as
contract labor did not fall within the "loaned servant" doc-
trine.1 41 In M.J. Daly, the employee, Varney, filed a common
law action against M.J. Daly Company (Daly) after collecting
workers' compensation benefits from his employer. Daly had
contracted for Varney's services through Varney's employer, a
labor service company. The evidence in the case indicated that
Daly had offered employment directly to Varney, but that Var-
ney had refused, electing to remain on his employer's payroll.'46
Recognizing that the labor service industry is a relatively new
and fast-growing development, and applying the three-part test
"I Id. at 730.
,o See Rice v. Conley, 414 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Ky. 1967) (adopting IC A. LARSON,
supra note 73, § 48.00 (1982)).
'14 414 S.W.2d at 140.
142 KRS § 342.700(1) (emphasis added).
143 See id.
I" No. 84-SC-523-DG (Ky. May 3, 1985).
14 Id., slip op. at 5.
"4 Id., slip op. at 1-2.
1985-86]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
previously mentioned, the Supreme Court found that Varney
was not a special servant of Daly. The Supreme Court found
that no contract for hire, either express or implied, existed
between Daly and Varney. The Court referred to IKRS section
342.640(1), which requires that such a contract for hire must
exist for there to be an employer-employee relationship. The
Court believed that it could not find such a contract since Varney
had specifically rejected employment with Daly. The Supreme
Court also relied upon the fact that Daly and the employer had
agreed that the employer would provide workers' compensation
benefits.' 47 The significance of this fact, however, is questionable
since the relationship to be examined is that between the em-
ployee and special employer, not the relationship between the
employers.
The Court overlooked the possibility that compensation cov-
erage was provided under KRS section 342.700. This statute allows
the employee of an independent contractor to recover compen-
sation benefits from the employer of the independent contractor,
when the work being performed is a regular or recurrent part
of the trade, business, or profession of the employer of the
independent contractor.' 4 The application of this statute would
have barred the common law action by Varney against Daly
under the exclusive remedy provision.' 49
The court of appeals, however, has refused to apply the
exclusive remedy provision in a common law action for bad faith
brought by an employee against an employer and an insurer. In
Mitchell v. Zurich American Life Insurance Co.,'50 after a Board
award in favor of the employee had been affirmed by all appel-
late courts, the employer and its insurance carrier began refusing
to pay the employee's medical expenses that were part of the
award. After finally securing payment, the employee filed a tort
action alleging bad faith by the employer and the insurer.' 5'
The court stated that once the award becomes final "the
employee has a vested right to receive timely compensation ben-
,,7 Id., slip op. at 4-5.
W, See KRS § 342.700(2) (1983).
1" KRS § 342.690 (1983).
,'o No. 84-CA-2693-MR (Ky. Ct. App.), 32 KLS 7, at 6 (Ky. Ct. App. May 3,
1985), discretionary rev. granted, 32 KLS 13, at 20 (Sept. 18, 1985).
- Id., slip op. at 2.
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efits and timely payment of medical expenses."' 5 2 Since the Act
provides sufficient avenues for relief if the employer has an
objection to a medical bill, 1 3 the employer has no right to
arbitrarily cease payment of the expenses. The court refused to
apply the exclusive remedy provisions of KRS section 342.690
to ban the claim against the employer, finding that this section
was enacted to combat the occasional breakdowns inherent in
any administrative process and not to provide a bullet-proof
shield for a continuing course of bad faith conduct.Y5 4
The court failed to discuss, however, the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown Badgett, Inc. v. Calloway,'55 in which the
Court held that the Board has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes
concerning medical bills.'5 6 Furthermore, the Act provides an
administrative remedy in these cases under which either the
employer or employee can file a motion with the Board to resolve
the dispute. 57 In the appropriate case, if the Board finds the
actions unreasonable, it may award the prevailing party its costs
and expenses, including attorney fees.5 8
Since the Supreme Court in Brown Badgett stated, regarding
the payment of medical bills, that "[ilt is perfectly apparent that
this legislation [KRS sections 342.035(1), 342.320(1), and 342.325]
reposes exclusive jurisdiction in the Workers' Compensation
Board to determine the issue in this case," '19 the court of appeals
may have taken a long step astray in allowing the bad faith
claim in Mitchell. As can be seen from the other cases discussed
in this section, the exclusive remedy provision of KRS section
342.690 is more expansive in scope than characterized by the
Court in Mitchell, which merely stated that the statute was
", Id., slip op. at 3.
'" The employer could have contested the payment of these bills before the Board
pursuant to KRS §§ 342.320 (1983) and 342.325 (1983), or through a declaratory
judgment action pursuant to KRS §§ 418.040 and 418.045.
No. 84-CA-2693-MR, slip op. at 4.
675 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1984).
' The Court, in so holding, found erroneous Hale v. Nugent Sand Co., 657
S.W.2d 246 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983), in which the appellate court estopped an employer
from disputing a medical bill that the employee sought to enforce in circuit court because
the employer had not brought a proceeding before the Board.
1 See 675 S.W.2d at 391.
15' See KRS § 342.310'(Cum. Supp. 1984).
09 675 S.W.2d at 391.
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designed "to combat the occasional breakdowns inherent in any
administrative process."'' ° Since the Act provides a mechanism
for regulation of doctors' fees, a forum for dispute resolution,
and a penalty for unreasonable actions, it would appear that the
Act has afforded a complete and full remedy.
In Mastin v. Liberal Markets,61 the Supreme Court allowed
an employer to recover from an employee a share of the em-
ployee's settlement in a products liability action in which the
employee failed to notify the employer or its insurance carrier
of the action. In this case, the employee, after filing a compen-
sation claim, filed a civil action against those third parties alleg-
edly responsible for her injuries. 62 The employee reached a
settlement with one of the defendants for $50,000, of which
$5,000 was allocated to lost wages and earning capacity, and
$5,000 to past and future medical expenses. Subsequently, the
Board awarded the employee a thirty-five percent permanent
partial disability. When the employer learned of the settlement
ten months later, the employer suspended payment of compen-
sation benefits. The employee brought suit in circuit court to
enforce the compensation award; the employer counterclaimed,
seeking to recover the amount it had paid under the award for
which the employee had gotten a double recovery. The circuit
court ruled that the employer was entitled only to a credit against
future payments. The court of appeals reversed, and the case
was accepted on discretionary review by the Kentucky Supreme
Court. 163
The Supreme Court ruled that the settlement qualified as a
"legal liability to pay damages" as contemplated under ICRS
section 342.700, which precludes double recovery from both the
employer and any third party.' 4 The Court rejected the employ-
ee's argument that KRS section 342.700 entitles an employer
only to a credit against future payments. 65 Consequently, the
Court strictly interpreted the statute, which provides that an
'1 84-CA-2693-MR, slip op. at 4.
1-1 674 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1984).
6 Id. at 9.
163 Id. at 10.
I Id. at 11-12.
161 Id. at 11.
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employee "shall not collect from both," and ruled that the
employer was entitled to restitution from the employee for the
overpayments.'66
Allocation of the settlement funds was governed by the
Court's prior decision in Hillman v. American Mutual Liberty
Insurance Co. 167 This decision outlines the method by which
such settlements, or jury verdicts, are to be divided between the
employer and the employee.1 68 Since there was no jury verdict
itemizing the recovery to which the employee was entitled, the
Court held that the employer was entitled to have the case
remanded to the trial court for a determination of the damages
to which the employee was entitled to recover and for allocation
of those damages to the categories of recovery which might, or
might not, be subject to the employer's statutory subrogation
rights. 169
V. REOPENING
In Continental Air Filter Co. v. Blair,170 the Kentucky Su-
preme Court injected more uncertainty into the standard for
'1 Id. at 14. In those cases in which the employee has not received payment of
compensation benefits, it is proper to credit the settlement of the civil action against
future compensation payments, under the authority of Southern Quarries & Contracting
Co. v. Hensley, 232 S.W.2d 999 (Ky. 1950).
631 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. 1982).
Se id. at 850.
' 674 S.W.2d at 13. The Court held:
They [employer and Special Fund] are entitled to have the case remanded
to the trial court to decide the proper amount which should be awarded
Ms. Mastin in damages for each of the various elements of damages
specified in the release evidencing the transaction between the Mastins and
Rose Exterminators [third party]. They are entitled to have such allocation
made initially without regard to prospects for obtaining from others the
payment of money necessary to pay for the various elements of damages
involved. Then they are entitled to subrogation credit against those elements
of damages which duplicate worker's compensation benefits, viz.: medical
expenses, lost wages and impairment or destruction of earning power. As
to these elements, less their proportionate share of attorneys' fees and
expenses incurred in effecting the recovery from Rose Exterminators, the
appellees have immediate entitlement by statutory subrogation as soon as
the facts can be determined.
Id.
170 681 S.W.2d 427 (Ky. 1984).
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reopening a claim under KRS section 342.125. This statute per-
mits a party to move the Workers' Compensation Board to
reopen a case, and review an otherwise final order, upon a
showing of change of condition.' 7' As discussed in the prior
Survey, 17 2 the court of appeals in Continental Air Filter Co.1
73
expanded the interpretation of change of condition to include a
change in economic conditions. The Supreme Court, however,
reversed the court of appeals, 174 finding that a change in eco-
nomic condition must be a change in physical condition as
originally required in the case of Osborne v. Johnson.
7 5
Either intentionally or through oversight, the majority opin-
ion failed to mention Mitsch v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 76 a prior
case in which the Court reinterpreted the phrase "change of
condition" to encompass a change in occupational disability as
distinguished from physical condition. 77 The Court in Mitsch
reasoned that since the Act was designed to compensate occu-
pational disability, a change in that occupational disability was
a basis for reopening.17 The failure to mention Mitsch, and the
statement that "[a] reopening must be based on a change in
physical condition,' 79 may cause some concern that the Court
has abandoned the "occupational disability" standard.
The majority opinion in Continental Air Filter Co. also
appears to ignore the fact that the employee, at the time of the
original opinion, was working in a "made work" job. IS Once
the Board opinion had become final the employer eliminated the
position.' 8' In a dissenting opinion, Justice Liebson recognized
the economic realities of the Court's decision. 8 2 He stated:
,In See KRS § 342.125(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1983).
172 See Harned, supra note 2, at 492.
17 No. 82-CA-1660-MR, 30 KLS 8 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 681 S.W.2d 427
(Ky. 1984).
174 681 S.W.2d at 428.
" 432 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1968).
176 487 S.W.2d 938 (Ky. 1972).
I" Id. at 939-40.
179 Id.
,79 681 S.W.2d at 428.
"a Id. at 427.
"' See id.
12 Id. at 429 (Liebson, J., dissenting).
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It [the Board] found the employee had undergone a "change
of conditions" entitling him to an increased award of total
occupational disability, limiting its decision to the facts of this
case. Had the Board found otherwise, it would encourage
employers to place a seriously injured employee in a light duty
position, and then effect his termination after the occupational
disability award becomes final. The majority opinion of this
case may provide such encouragement.8 3
The majority opinion takes from the Board the flexibility that
could encourage the employment of injured employees. The
social goal of the Act is not only compensation, but also "res-
toration of the injured employee to gainful employment."' 184 This
goal is frustrated if the Board is unable to reduce an award
when the employer has paid wages to the employee or to increase
the award when that employment is terminated.
VI. SIEoiFs AND CREDITs
A. Private Disability Plans
Since South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. George,8 5 it has
been clear that an employer may not take a credit against a
compensation award for disability benefits paid under a privately
negotiated disability plan, except to the extent represented by
the employer's weekly liability for compensation. To the extent
that voluntary disability benefits paid in a given week exceed the
compensation rate, no credit will be allowed. 86 The plan at
question in South Central Bell supplemented workers' compen-
sation. 18 7 The court of appeals, in Beth-Elkhorn Corp. v. Lu-
cas,88 expanded the rule of South Central Bell holding that an
employer is entitled to such a credit whenever it provides addi-
tional disability benefits at no cost to the employee. 89
In Beth-Elkhorn, the employer had provided, as part of the
compensation package, a disability plan that provided benefits
" Id.
KRS § 342.710(1) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
619 S.W.2d 723 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
' Id. at 725.
' Id. at 724.




at the employee's regular rate of pay for disability caused by
sickness, accident, or pregnancy. 90 The employee argued that
the employer should not be entitled to a credit since there was
no integration between the disability plan and the Act.' 9' The
employee argued that this was the determinative factor in South
Central Bell.192 The court of appeals, in Beth-Elkhorn, however,
said that an expression that the disability plan is supplemental
to workers' compensation is not, in fact, determinative. 193 The
court stated: "We deem important the fact that the employer
herein provided these additional disability benefits at no appar-
ent cost to the employee." ''94
B. Voluntary Worker's Compensation Benefits
In prior case law, the courts had made a distinction between
voluntary disability benefits and voluntary payment of compen-
sation benefits when allowing a credit against future payments.
In Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Adkins, 95 the court of
appeals allowed a dollar-for-dollar credit when compensation
benefits were voluntarily overpaid.196 In General Electric Co. v.
Morris,97 a case involving a claim of credit for compensation
benefits previously paid, the Supreme Court announced that any
credit taken by an employer is not a dollar-for-dollar credit. 93
In this case, the employer had voluntarily paid its employee
compensation benefits for temporary total disability at the rate
of ninety-six dollars per week.199 After the employee's case was
reopened, the Board entered an award under which General
Electric was ordered to pay the worker $12.74 per week. 200 The
1' Id. at 481.
M' See id. at 482.
i Id. at 481.
See id. at 482.
' Id. The court of appeals also ruled that the Special Fund was not entitled to
take a credit for disability payments made by the employer, as the cost of that disability
plan was borne solely by the employer. Id.
191 619 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
See id. at 502-03.
670 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1984).
See id. at 856.




employer argued that it was entitled to a dollar-for-dollar credit
for all voluntary benefits paid.20 1 The Court, however, ruled that
the employer could credit only the weeks for which voluntary
payments were made against the weeks for which workers' com-
pensation benefits were due pursuant to the Board award.202 The
Court ruled:
[A] dollar-for-dollar credit for voluntary payments in excess
of the compensation found to be due would seem to frustrate
the purpose of the compensation act that periodic payments
over a statutorily set period be made, absent agreement by the
parties and approval by the Board. See KRS 342.040 and
342.150. By allowing full credit, the claimant, as would be the
case here, could be deprived of many future periodic pay-
ments. 2o3
The dissenting opinion recognized the merit of General Elec-
tric's argument that the denial of a full credit will discourage
employers from making voluntary payments in the future.2°4 The
dissenting opinion was written by Justice Vance, who, while on
the court of appeals, wrote the opinion in Western Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Adkins.205 The Adkins court expressed concern
over penalizing an employer who makes voluntary payments. 206
The Supreme Court did not even mention this opinion when
deciding General Electric. The Supreme Court did not even
squarely address the fact that they were allowing a double re-
covery by the employee, although in Mastin v. Liberal Mar-
kets,m°7 albeit a different fact situation, the Court ruled that the
employee was not entitled to double recovery.20 It appears that
in reaching the decision the Court confused the concept of credits
for compensation benefits and credits for voluntary disability
benefits, in relying in part on South Central Bell 09 rather than
Western Casualty & Surety.
211 Id. at 856.
'o Id. at 855-57.
Id. at 856.
Id. at 857 (Vance, J., dissenting).
- 619 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 502-03.
20 674 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1984).
1' Id. at 11-12. See notes 161-66 supra and accompanying text.
11 See text accompanying notes 185-87 supra.
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The dissenting opinion in General Electric is probably correct
in its concern that employers will refuse to make voluntary
payments to employees, rather than risk overpayment. This re-
sult will be to the detriment of those employees who need such
compensation payments. The employee has already received the
compensation benefits awarded, and consequently is not penal-
ized by a dollar-for-dollar credit. 210 Since General Electric was
decided by a 4-3 vote, the ramifications of this decision may be
reexamined in the future with hopefully a different result.
VII. APPELLATE PRACTICE
A number of decisions were written during the survey period
regarding appellate practice within the field of workers' com-
pensation. In Stewart v. Lawson,21 1 the Board originally found
that the employee had not contracted pneumoconiosis "while in
the employ of the defendant coal company. ' 21 2 The circuit court
reversed, remanding the case to the Board for findings as to
whether the employee suffered from an occupational disease and,
if so, whether the employee received an injurious exposure while
employed by the defendant. On remand, the Board found that
the movant employee suffered from an occupational disease in
the form of pneumoconiosis and that the employee had, in fact,
received his last injurious exposure while employed by the
defendant. The defendant successfully appealed to the court of
appeals, but the Supreme Court reversed, affirming the Board
award. 21
3
The Supreme Court found that the Board's second opinion
was proper because it did not conflict with the Board's first
opinion. 2 4 In its first opinion, the Board found only that the
employee did not contract pneumoconiosis "while in the employ
of the defendant coal company. 2 1 5 Therefore, the Board's sub-
sequent findings that the employee suffered an occupational
disease and that the defendant employer was his last "injurious
210 See 670 S.W.2d at 857 (Vance, J., dissenting).
21" 689 S.W.2d 21 (Ky. 1985).
2I Id. at 22.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 23.
"I Id. at 22.
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exposure," did not in any way conflict with the Board's initial
findings.2 16
In Eaton Axle Corp. v. Nally,2 7 the Supreme Court noted
that the Board in its opinions has repeatedly failed to make the
necessary factual findings. 2 8 The Court shifted the burden for
correcting this error, however, to the attorneys handling the
cases. 2 9 Since the Act provides for reconsideration by the Board
of its opinions and orders, 2 0 the Court held that a party must
avail itself of this procedure before a case will be reversed for
failure to make factual findings. 22 The Court further stated that
prospectively from the date of this decision, no Board award
will be reversed for failure to make a requisite finding until the
Board has been given the opportunity to first correct its error. 222
The practicing bar came under criticism in an unpublished
decision for the number of compensation appeals being brought
before the court of appeals. In Woolum v. Woolum,2 the court
noted that thirteen percent of its cases were workers' compen-
sation cases, many of which only contested the findings of fact
by the Board. Since such findings will not be disturbed if there
is any substantive evidence in the record to support them, "an
appeal on this point is an exercise in futility and a waste of
judicial time and energy.' '22 The court stated that in future cases
it will not hesitate to assess costs or other penalties against the
offending parties under either KRS section 342.310 or Kentucky
Rule of Civil Procedure 73.02. 221
211 Id. at 23.
211 688 S.W.2d 334 (Ky. 1985).
216 See id. at 337.
2I, See id. at 338.
See KRS § 342.281 (Bobbs-Merrill 1983).
See 688 S.W.2d at 338.
Id. The Court equated KRS § 342.281 with Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure
52.04, which prohibits a civil judgment from being reversed unless the failure to make
a factual finding is brought to the attention of the trial court for correction. Id.
No. 84-CA-758-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1984).
n4 Id., slip op. at 4. The court was referring to cases in which the Board had
found in favor of the claimant. The standard of review when the Board finds against a
claimant is even more exacting, as the claimant must show on appeal that the evidence
in his favor is so strong as to compel a ruling in his favor. See Semet-Solvay, Div. of
Allied Chem. Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 410 S.W.2d 405 (Ky. 1966).
I" No. 84-CA-758-MR, slip op. at 4.
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